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Mechanism design - Wikipedia
Mechanism design - Wikipedia

CURRICULUM VITAE David MARTIMORT SHORT BIOGRAPHY David Martimort holds a  position as a Directeur d'´Etudes at Ecole des Haute
CURRICULUM VITAE David MARTIMORT SHORT BIOGRAPHY David Martimort holds a position as a Directeur d'´Etudes at Ecole des Haute

The Historical Origins of 'Open Science': An Essay on Patronage, Reputation  and Common Agency Contracting in the Scienti
The Historical Origins of 'Open Science': An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scienti

How Technology Stole Our Minds – Thought Economics
How Technology Stole Our Minds – Thought Economics

Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review

Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification
Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification

Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review

Copyright infringement - Wikipedia
Copyright infringement - Wikipedia

Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US  healthcare system - Frandsen - 2019 - The RAND Journal of Economics - Wiley  Online Library
Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system - Frandsen - 2019 - The RAND Journal of Economics - Wiley Online Library

Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The  Single Agent Case
Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case

CURRICULUM VITAE. David MARTIMORT - PDF Free Download
CURRICULUM VITAE. David MARTIMORT - PDF Free Download

Customer Poaching and Brand Switching
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching

Agency Theory
Agency Theory

PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective  governance and a research agenda
PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda

The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective  governance and a research agenda
PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda

Common Agency and the Revelation Principle
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle

Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection

DELEGATION PRINCIPLE FOR MULTI-AGENCY GAMES UNDER EX POST EQUILIBRIUM Yu  Chen (Communicated by the invited editor Filomena Garci
DELEGATION PRINCIPLE FOR MULTI-AGENCY GAMES UNDER EX POST EQUILIBRIUM Yu Chen (Communicated by the invited editor Filomena Garci

Games Played through Agents
Games Played through Agents

Industrial Organization III: Contract Theory (EC855
Industrial Organization III: Contract Theory (EC855

Congress's Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies -  EveryCRSReport.com
Congress's Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies - EveryCRSReport.com

The Economic Theory of Incentives
The Economic Theory of Incentives

PDF) Basic Service Delivery - A Quantitative Survey Approach
PDF) Basic Service Delivery - A Quantitative Survey Approach

Principal-Agent Models | SpringerLink
Principal-Agent Models | SpringerLink

Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory - Persée
Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory - Persée

PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective  governance and a research agenda
PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda